INCREASING
ACCOUNTABILITY AMONG HUMANITARIAN NGOS IN DISASTER RESPONSE
A
Study for the Sphere Project Management Committee
Geneva,
July 2000
Loubna
Freih
Project
Researcher
INCREASING
ACCOUNTABILITY AMONG HUMANITARIAN NGOS IN DISASTER RESPONSE
CONTENTS
II. Introduction 4
Methodology 4
Limits
of Study 5
Definition
of Terms 5
III. Accountability in Current Context of
Humanitarian Action 6
Drivers
of Accountability 6
Multiple
accountability 6
The
Development of the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards 7
IV. Current Accountability Efforts 9
A.
Monitoring and Evaluations 9
B.
Reporting and Disclosure Mechanisms 9
C.
External Evaluations 10
D.
Complaint-Handling Mechanisms 11
E.
Accreditation 15
F.
Peer Review at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 16
G.
Social Auditing 16
H.
The Humanitarian Accountability Project 17
V. Using the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum
Standards to Increase Accountability 18
Scenario
1: Collaborative Assessments and Evaluations 19
Table
1: Descriptions of collaborative assessments and collaborative evaluations 20
Table
2: Phases of Development of Collaborative Assessments/Evaluations Scenario 23
Scenario
2: Accreditation 24
VI. Conclusion 26
Table
3: Steps in Developing an Accountability Model to Sphere 26
The
Importance of Change 26
Over the past ten years, the public, donors and people affected by disasters have come to demand greater accountability on the part of humanitarian organizations. As the number and reach of such organizations have grown so too has the interest in transparency.
Even though there are apprehensions about engaging in a process of increased accountability, most NGOs agree that accountability to disaster-affected people needs increasing. Sphere’s Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards alone cannot provide a complete accountability framework but they do provide a tool for broadening accountability.
Several efforts and initiatives within the humanitarian NGO sector in recent years have laid the groundwork for developing accountability mechanisms. Within the UK-based Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), for example, independent external evaluations are now a prerequisite for participation in an appeal while several UK and Irish NGOs have voluntarily incorporated the People in Aid Code and gone through social audits. In Australia, Canada, Germany and the US, to mention a few, national NGO networks have, or are in the process of, introducing administrative standards and systems of NGO complaint-handling to ensure greater compliance and quality control. In fact, a group of US-based InterAction members who are involved in child sponsoring are going as far as to set up an external monitoring and accreditation process regarding their work.
Nevertheless, most of these efforts have been ad-hoc, brought to life by a few individuals, rather than by any organized move within the NGO sector. Frequently, these initiatives have originated or been spurred on by actual media investigations or fear of potential coverage rather than by a commitment to the principles of accountability and transparency.
This research concludes (as other actors in the humanitarian complex have drawn for themselves) that, in the short- to medium-term, there is a need for improved internal monitoring and room for joint, peer-based assessments and evaluations. Yet peer-based assessment and evaluations models may not engender sufficient credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the public and disaster-affected communities. A degree of transparency would increase pressure on agencies to maintain quality in assistance delivery and subsequently, encourage improvements in humanitarian response.
With time, such steps can provide the ground for trust-building and eventual improvement in the quality of programming, and perhaps, in the longer-run, lead toward more system-wide compliance and accountability including a complaint-handling mechanism. However, at present, it is not feasible to introduce such a mechanism as it is impossible to engage with complaints without a system such as an NGO accreditation system. Unresolved issues include the basis for complaints lodged, the jurisdiction and authority of the complaint-handling body, and the types of action–remedial or punitive–in response to complaints.
This study was commissioned by the Sphere Project Management Committee
to identify and review accountability efforts in the NGO sector including
various quality assurance efforts and complaint-handling mechanisms that could
be adapted for the humanitarian world. This study aimed to develop a “toolbox”
of potential mechanisms that could be applied to Management Committee members’
respective agency, family and/or network.
Since its inception in 1997, the Sphere Project has recognized that the
creation of a handbook would not in itself lead to greater adherence to the
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards. Thus, this study was commissioned
to explore how agencies could proactively use the Humanitarian Charter and
Minimum Standards to increase their own accountability.
Any research on accountability and compliance in the humanitarian world
needs to take into account the context of disaster response. Humanitarian NGOs operate
in rapidly changing situations, which are often politically complex; stressful
mentally and physically; and frequently with inadequate resources. The nature
of the job has led to a culture of ‘short-termism” which, in turn, is
exaggerated by the high turnover of field staff.
Discussions about accountability and compliance must also include the
roles and responsibilities of the many actors in disaster response including
those of the host government, international organizations and the international
community, donors, UN agencies, as well as international and national NGOs.
While recognizing this, the research concentrates primarily on international
and national NGOs which are members of the Sphere Project Management Committee
(see Annex 1).
This research does not focus on regulation but proposes ways to
increase accountability between humanitarian NGOs and disaster-affected people
by ensuring greater adherence to quality standards.
The aims of the study consisted of: identifying and reviewing different
mechanisms promoting accountability (primarily to disaster-affected people) and
compliance to codes of conduct, either through quality assurance efforts or
complaint-handling mechanisms; describing and reviewing mechanisms potentially
applicable to agencies wishing to use the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and
Minimum Standards; proposing ways in which members of the Sphere Project
Management Committee can promote knowledge of, and eventual use of, the
suggested quality assurance and complaint-handling methodologies.
A two-way methodology was adopted for this research to develop feasible suggestions for improving adherence to the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards. First, successful methods for increasing accountability in use outside the humanitarian NGO sector are reviewed. Second, those methods that could integrate with humanitarian NGOs’ current practices and procedures for monitoring, evaluation, reporting and disclosure, are explored.
This researcher conducted primary research including several interviews
at headquarters with agencies members of the Sphere Project Management
Committee, with directors or representatives of the agency networks involved in
Sphere, and with experts on specific compliance mechanisms and on
accountability; and through secondary research by identifying and reviewing
compliance mechanisms used among other networks and sectors. A list of the
people contacted as well as a list of sources are included in Annexes 4 & 5
respectively.
This research is not a comprehensive review of accountability and compliance in disaster response for humanitarian NGOs—no interviews were planned nor undertaken with disaster-affected people, with agency staff at field level, with Southern NGOs, with donors or representatives of governments (including host governments and the UN and its agencies). Even though the Sphere Project’s far-reaching interagency consultative process and the large number of agencies represented on the Management Committee is impressive—it does not include everybody.
Finally, this research looks globally at humanitarian NGOs that constitute the Sphere Management Committee and thus does not attempt to offer individualized suggestions. For that, additional research is required to review how individual agencies and alliances monitor, report and manage information internally so as to better understand their performance in relation to stakeholder groups (in particular disaster-affected people but also peers, donors, and the public).
· Accountability: “The responsibility to demonstrate to stakeholders, foremost of whom are disaster-affected people, that humanitarian assistance complies with agreed standards.[1]” Accountability can be broken down into three main components[2]: compliance, transparency and responsiveness.
Compliance concerns the duty to comply with agreed standards regarding both organizational policies and practices, and the reporting of policies and performance. Transparency concerns the duty to account to those with a legitimate interest, such as the stakeholders
Responsiveness concerns the responsibility of the organization for its acts and omissions, including the processes of decision-making and the results of these decisions.
·
Disaster-affected people is a term used throughout this report to describe all
disaster-affected people that should be receiving humanitarian aid—whether they
do or not.
What is driving humanitarian NGOs to become more
accountable in the current context of humanitarian action? Here are some key drivers presented at a recent Active Learning Network on
Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) meeting[3]:
·
External pressure from donors, public (media), governments, and
international organizations;
· Internal strategy whereby an organization sees strategic value in being more effective by involving disaster-affected people or by disclosing evaluation results or by allowing external verification of compliance to commonly-held standards and best practices. For example, as a result of direct operational responsibilities being delegated to the field, MSF-Holland head office began an internal push towards improved monitoring.[4];
· Values of humanitarian NGOs.
Taking this analysis further, the current context in
humanitarian action is one where drivers for accountability have largely come
from external pressure. In several countries, negative press reports led to
increased calls for accountability. In the US, the bouts of negative coverage
on child sponsoring several years ago led NGOs involved in child sponsoring
activities such as Save the Children Fund US and Childreach to develop rigorous
standards and to contract an external organization to monitor compliance and
accredit US NGOs involved with this work[5].
Additionally, perceived wrongdoing by one agency can
affect the image of the whole community. In the wake of negative media
allegations against a prominent NGO in Australia in 1995, the government pushed
for increased accountability. The national NGO body—Australian Council For
Overseas Aid (ACFOA)—decided it was better to self-regulate rather than to
allow the government to monitor NGO behavior. It introduced a code of conduct
and a complaint-handling committee.
Acting as a positive driver, several Southern
NGOs—some of whom are Sphere implementing partners or are International Council
of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) members—perceive the Sphere Standards as an
advocacy tool and as an opportunity to ask for further resources.
Humanitarian NGOs operate in an environment where they are accountable to several actors and where the accountability line stretches far, including in one direction to donors, sponsors and the general public and in another direction to recipients and all disaster-affected people. Specific national laws and regulations on NGO financial disclosure go some way toward regulating upward accountability[6]. However, no national or international law, regulation, or even best practices exists that offer guidance toward the shape, form, and frequency of accountability to disaster-affected people. As Nick Stockton argues: “While donors are often seen as having too much influence within the humanitarian accountability complex, legitimate humanitarian claimants have little if any influence beyond their involuntary participation in nutrition surveys, head-counts, commodity distributions and unsolicited media coverage.”[7]
Yet others argue that no single humanitarian agency can be held to account in disaster response because of external factors that are beyond its control—that, therefore, there is no “collective accountability”[8].
The voluntary creation of humanitarian standards in
disaster response by a large consultative movement from within the humanitarian
NGO community is the result of several developments that have taken place in
the last decade as previously noted. In addition:
·
The growing number of assistance providers in disaster response
(international and national non governmental organizations, government
services, national and international military forces, and UN agencies) has, in
turn, led to several developments: (a) an increased discrepancy in the quality
of assistance provided by a plethora of actors; (b) a desire by NGOs to
differentiate themselves from other assistance providers by demonstrating their
commitment to humanitarian principles and their commitment to disaster-affected
people; (c) a push from donors, governments and the public (led by the media)
demanding greater NGO accountability based on real and perceived failures;
·
The dramatic increase in the complexity and frequency of humanitarian
operations and in the scale of humanitarian assistance, reaching 10% of
official aid in 1994[9];
·
Increased scrutiny by the media, public and governments;
·
Shift in dialogue in humanitarian assistance into more “rights-based”
advocacy
The above factors led to a push for improved quality
in humanitarian response and for greater accountability toward
disaster-affected people. The Sphere Project began to answer some of the
concerns raised by providing a quality mechanism embodied in the Humanitarian
Charter and Minimum Standards. It has done so in three major ways:
·
Articulating arguments for the universal right to assistance — based on
international legal instruments;
·
Providing a common language that describes core principles and actions through the
largest voluntary, interagency consultative effort;
·
Consolidating lessons learned and setting minimum standards in core sectors
of humanitarian assistance.
The Sphere Project’s stated aims are to improve the quality of assistance
provided to people affected by disasters and to enhance the accountability of the humanitarian system in disaster
response[10]. By providing standards and
indicators in five core areas—water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid,
shelter and site planning and health services—Sphere is meant to be used as a
tool. Through the production of the handbook, it ensures that good practice
experiences are documented and shared and, through the dissemination and
training efforts, are used as references, benchmarks, and goals.
Quality can only be assured if there is an accountability mechanism that, by definition, monitors compliance to agreed standards or codes; is transparent; and has a mechanism to respond to redress a problem[11]. Yet, at present, the Sphere Project has no accountability mechanism and has not the ability nor the intent to police agencies who are committed to uphold the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards or to monitor compliance of performance. It is difficult to estimate what will be the impact of Sphere and whether humanitarian NGOs—North and South—will be able to learn from and assimilate Sphere without some form of accountability and compliance mechanisms. Several people interviewed for this research feared that in a worst case scenario Sphere would remain but an unread book on a shelf.
Sphere also provides a learning mechanism by which agencies voluntarily—through interagency consultation, sector and cross-sector discussions—take part in a process of developing universal disaster response standards. Consultation with the whole NGO community is essential to increasing a broad-based commitment to the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards. Of course, this dialogue must also include disaster-affected people and recipients of humanitarian assistance if it is to have significance.
Specific concerns have been raised about Sphere that include a fear that donors will misuse the Minimum Standards by narrowly applying the indicators and making funding conditional. This may, in turn, compromise Southern NGOs’ ability to secure funding and raises questions about capacity building. Several agencies argue that a best practice and quality approach goes against individual agencies’ mandate and that being monitored to Sphere’s Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards conflicts with agency independence. Yet, organizational mandate and agency independence cannot and should not be an excuse for not maintaining the highest quality response[12].
As mentioned earlier, it is critical that other actors in humanitarian response also become more accountable. For example, it is important to reaffirm that the State has the legal responsibility to its citizens even though in emergencies, when a State is no longer capable or willing to fulfill that responsibility, humanitarian NGOs take on part of that responsibility.
Monitoring and
evaluations are part of any accountability effort. Their effectiveness or role
as an accountability tool depends largely on 1) how they are actually
performed—the methodology, frequency, and who is involved—and 2) what they are
meant to do, i.e. create lessons learned or justify current policies and
practices.
Furthermore,
monitoring and evaluation practices and objectives vary significantly among
agencies, alliances and networks in the humanitarian system. Throughout
humanitarian NGOs, monitoring and evaluation practices tend to be inconsistent
and—even though this has improved in the last few years—performed on an ad-hoc
basis. Too often, still, these result in little change in policies or
procedures. This excludes monitoring and evaluations such as self-assessments
and participatory evaluations which may lead to change.
It is not the aim
of this report to describe the specific policies and practices of agencies or
alliances that form the Sphere Project Management Committee. However, any
attempt at increasing accountability of humanitarian NGOs through monitoring
and evaluation needs consider the following questions[13]:
·
Are indicators used for project proposal, monitoring and evaluation?
·
Are indicators used in situation, country, and technical reports;
reports to donors?
·
Are national agencies within a family reviewed according to the same
criteria, e.g. standards, outputs, indicators? Does independence within a
family go so far as to mean very little control over individual national
agencies?
·
What is the basis for indicator development and selection?
The conclusions of a research by the Overseas Development Institute
(ODI) found that evaluations of humanitarian assistance programs offered no
study of impact; no methodological transparency; no involvement of
beneficiaries; no possibility of feed back from the evaluated agency; and no
follow up of recommendations[14].
There is a need for monitoring and evaluations to grow more systematic
and transparent. While associations such as ALNAP are providing a platform to
enrich this debate and allow for more systematic learning on monitoring and
evaluations policies and practices, Sphere is one tool for those agencies
committed to the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards to test their
respective monitoring and evaluations policies and procedures.
What NGOs frequently report on can be divided into three main
categories[15]:
1.
Statutory/legal reporting requirement based on national laws and
national government standards, such as NGO registration or financial
disclosure;
2.
Reporting requirement which include professional standards (in health
and nutrition), donor requirements, or UN standards and principles;
3.
Informal reporting based on best practices in the field (including
Sphere), donor recommendations.
Like monitoring and evaluation practices, there are varying degrees of disclosure of these reports among humanitarian NGOs. According to many agencies, disclosure raises difficult issues. Several agencies comment that they are torn between providing information to the public such as evaluations or reviews to show that they are willing to look critically at themselves and with the concern that this may be misunderstood by the public and misused by the media (‘cherry-picking’)[16]. One agency, for example, states it is worried that it would be the only organization to disclose this information and as such the media and the public may not realize that other organizations (who do not make their evaluations public) have similar or worse results[17].
Even so, actually disclosing information does not necessarily lead to increased accountability. Several questions were raised, for example, during the social auditing process of the People In Aid Code[18], including:
·
Are reporting and disclosure requirements standardized within a family?
Are they passed on to beneficiaries? Are lessons learned passed on to other
national agencies or country offices within a family, alliance or network?
·
Is the information disclosed readable, accessible to the public (i.e.
free of charge) and in what language? Can readers of disclosed information
respond, i.e. is there an actual dialogue?
Clearly, disclosure alone does not guarantee accountability, but it does move in the direction of transparency, one of the elements of any accountability system.
Outside evaluation, conducted by one or more independent evaluators, is another method that is currently been used by some humanitarian NGOs. The quality and objectivity of outside evaluations depend on a number of factors including the terms of reference of outside evaluators, the access of evaluators to field staff and disaster-affected people. Whether the agency or family under evaluation will assimilate the lessons learned and respond to criticisms by changing policies and practices is not assured. Making the evaluation public may help toward legitimizing the process and providing an incentive for the agency or family to learn from its mistakes. However, as stated above, disclosure leads to concerns that public evaluations may be misunderstood by the media and the public.
Independent public evaluations—such as the one released in early 2000 that reviewed UNHCR’s policies and response to the Kosovo Crisis—are fairly recent accountability mechanisms within the UN system. Within the NGO community, the DEC policy and practice of independent external evaluations eight months after an Appeal launch, was made a prerequisite in 1997 for both membership in the DEC and participation in a particular appeal. Interestingly, one could argue that DEC member agencies have become more transparent, and therefore accountable, within the DEC than they are within their own systems.
Those developments for both institutions were made during periods of change that provided a window of opportunity. Additionally, in both cases the benefits gained overcame the risks involved. Several factors led to the inclusion and acceptance of independent evaluation by the DEC membership[19]: 1) the re-organization of the DEC in 1997 including new members; 2) media that had been reporting on a certain lack of accountability on the part of DEC agencies; and 3) no-one foresaw the real impact of evaluation and associated lesson learning and the enthusiasm with which middle rank management would take it up (see Annex 2)
An interesting parallel can be drawn to UNHCR’s experience with the independent evaluation on Kosovo. In the end, it received much praise for the process of accountability and transparency it had engendered and little criticism about its shortcomings in the crisis[20]. By disclosing in its entirety the lengthy and comprehensive outside evaluation on the Website, UNHCR went some way toward increasing accountability to its stakeholders. Moreover, during the next refugee crisis, the media and other observers will be watching UNHCR for some degree of responsiveness and changed behavior based on the criticisms and recommendations made public. Thus, the linkage between transparency and responsiveness—two important elements of any accountability effort—is evident.
According to Jeff Crisp of UNHCR, NGOs today are lagging behind other actors in the humanitarian complex in accountability: “….UN agencies are now at least as (if not more) transparent in terms of evaluation than many major NGOs. Thus very few of the major British relief agencies make either internal or external evaluations of their work available on the internet, whereas this has become a common practice within the UN system.”[21]
The UNHCR is developing a number of new methodologies to better evaluate its operations, programs and policies and adopt a more participatory and beneficiary-based approach to evaluation of humanitarian programs[22]. For example, it is currently testing an innovative evaluation technique that is participatory and employs a beneficiary approach in Guinea and has plans to undertake joint evaluations of specific interventions between several UN agencies (an MoU was recently signed in New York to undertake one major evaluation between OCHA, WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR), or between stakeholders and UNHCR (for example, between UNHCR, a donor and a NGO).
For the last decade, and in particular since the development of the Red Cross Code of Conduct in 1994, a number of national efforts have taken place to: 1) provide parameters for NGO behavior on the ground and 2) allow for lodging of complaints at the headquarter level, such as with InterAction, and at national level, such as with the Ethiopia Code of Conduct for NGOs (see Annex 2).
The use of complaint-handling mechanisms, where one NGO can lodge a complaint about another NGO or individual working for an NGO through a secretariat or committee, have been introduced into existing national NGO membership networks or developed specifically to reinforce compliance to a code of conduct by its signatories. Overall, these codes of conduct tend to concentrate on NGO behavior rather than on competency to deliver appropriate services, in particular around administrative standards relating to management and finances.
No independent monitoring takes place. Instead members self-certify (annually) to their compliance to the specific Code of Conduct or agencies commit at the time of the signature to their adherence to the specific Code of Conduct. The success of this type of compliance model depends to a large extent on how well the Code of Conduct has been internalized and implemented by its members or signatories and on how effective is the support mechanism to help members or signatories to be in compliance. The Canadian Council for International Co-Operation, for example, introduced a Code of Ethics in 1995 with a view to establish a complaint-handling mechanism a couple of years later (see Annex 2). According to the Program Officer, it has taken much longer to help members introduce policies and practices necessary to ensure implementation and compliance to the Code[23]. In addition, performance indicators are seldom developed to enable members or signatories to effectively monitor their compliance to the code.
To effectively develop a complaint-handling mechanism, a number of decisions need to be made at the outset, including agreement on:
· the nature of the complaints that can be entertained, i.e. based on deficient quality of programs, coordination problems, inappropriateness of response, or “unprofessional behavior” (usually, criminal behavior is referred to the authorities);
· the entity that can legitimately address the complaints, (for example, a committee or panel which includes outside experts/members);
· remedies and sanctions for non-compliance and procedures for redress. The Australian Council for Overseas Aid has in place an elaborate system that is presented as a nine-week timeframe starting from a written complaint. It provides for conciliation, formal investigation of major breaches by a committee if conciliation is unsuccessful, and appeals (see Annex 2). If complaints are upheld, outcomes could include notification of interested parties and the public of the results of the investigation, and withdrawal of government aid funding.
To date, very few complaints have been filed officially through complaint-handling mechanisms demonstrating a certain resistance by agencies to make use of the system. Additionally, an oft-recurring criticism about complaint-handling mechanisms is that they are complaint-driven and, thus, offer little flexibility for redress or adaptation to an emergency situation. It is unclear whether a system centralized at head quarter can adequately respond to complaints that relate to disaster response and that are likely to be raised at the field level, as described below in the case of InterAction. Ideally, a large majority of complaints could be resolved in the field without headquarter involvement.
Yet, field-based complaint-handling mechanisms have so far offered little positive developments in terms of compliance and accountability. Few resources exist to ensure training and support necessary for agencies to implement the code. Additionally, such mechanisms have raised concerns of legitimacy, authority, and exclusiveness. A recent study of the Joint Policy Operations (JPO) and Principles and Protocols of Humanitarian Operation (PPHO) in Liberia and the Agreement on Ground Rules in South Sudan by the Overseas Development Institute concluded that agencies had a selective or opportunistic application of in-country codes and principles[24]. The compliance mechanism developed for the PPHO, for example, offered no guide for implementation, no provision for monitoring, and no enforcement mechanism in the event of an agency not fulfilling its obligations.
In conclusion, this research has found little willingness on behalf of the Sphere Project Management Committee members, or the humanitarian community at large, to engage in the creation of a complaint-handling mechanism specifically for Sphere. Examples of field-based and headquarter complaint handling mechanisms are described below.
At Field
Level: Code of Conduct for NGOs in Ethiopia
There has been a proliferation of country-based codes in the field. The Code of Conduct for NGOs in Ethiopia, for example, grew out of the demand for increased transparency and accountability as the number of NGOs in Ethiopia rose[25]. Established in 1999, some 80% of local and international NGOs in Ethiopia have willingly signed onto the Code[26] and therefore have agreed to be accountable to complaints to an Observance Committee. The Committee will consider complaints by persons or groups of persons lodged to the Secretariat of the Committee—currently the Christian Relief & Development Association (CRDA). To date, three petitions have been considered by the Committee: the first was dismissed on the grounds that there was no breach of the Code, the second, involving child sexual abuse, resulted in the Committee’s decision to cancel then signatory membership. This raises the following questions: should such complaint-handling mechanisms deal with criminal matters or should they be referred to the national justice system? Will the cancellation of the signatory’s membership follow the NGO to other countries where it is active? (The third is pending).
Aside from committing NGOs to transparency and accountability, good governance and independence, some of the positive developments included in the Ethiopian Code include the requirement for NGOs to develop impact indicators for their work and to share assessments and evaluations publicly.
It is unclear at this stage how effective would integrating some form of compliance to the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards into those field-based initiatives. For example, what standards are used to develop the in-country code? What if these are different that the ones establish in the Sphere handbook? What are the indicators or benchmarks used to monitor compliance or non-compliance? What are the remedies/sanctions for non-compliance?
At Head Quarter Level: InterAction
InterAction was one of the first NGO networks to establish a complaint-handling mechanism and has undertaken much research and soul-searching to find methods to improve members’ performance based on accepted standards. InterAction’s Private Voluntary Organization (or PVO) Standards were first agreed upon by members in 1992 and self-certification by InterAction’s current and prospective members began in 1994. Four complaints/concerns have been received since 1994: two resulted in actual redress including in a member agency’s withdrawal of inappropriate advertizing (see Annex 2).
At InterAction’s last Annual Meeting in April 2000, members voted to include Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in the existing PVO standards regarding disaster response. Members engaged in disaster response will now be “guided and informed” by the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards[27]. Thus, InterAction members who work in disaster response are expected to take the Sphere documents into consideration when conducting their operations. They must self-certify annually that they are in compliance with this PVO standard.
Recognizing that this level of commitment is tentative, InterAction plans to create a roster of members who commit themselves to integrate the Sphere documents into their operations. Because this procedure will not be tied to InterAction’s PVO Standards, the compliance mechanism in the PVO Standards will not apply to the commitment made by agencies which ask to be included on the roster.
This raises two issues regarding InterAction members’ compliance to Sphere in the future:
- Will Sphere standards be internalized by member agencies if no tighter regulations are in place, i.e. will disaster response programs be guided by Sphere? Will this translate into member agencies’ compliance to Sphere standards?
- How will InterAction’s Standards Committee, charged with monitoring compliance with the PVO Standards, address complaints about non-compliance to Sphere?
Within InterAction, several member organizations have called for the strengthening of PVO standards and their implementation by moving from the existing self-certification process to some form of peer monitoring[28]. To this end, it is looking at the development of performance indicators, a self-study process, and training of members in its use as a first step – with future consideration of a peer review process. However, in doing so InterAction will have to address concerns raised by some members, including:
· Can the pursuit of more rigorous standards be implemented without moving toward accreditation?
· Should accreditation be a long-term goal and is it feasible given both the expense and the diversity of activities the membership undertakes?
· Is it possible to consider a tiered membership with accreditation available at the top tier for those organizations interested in pursuing accreditation? (see example of Maryland Nonprofits in section E and Annex 2).
Accreditation involves an independent body that undertakes a monitoring process of compliance to a set of standards or codes and makes the decision to accredit applicants accordingly. Accreditation is increasingly to be found in health-services NGOs, as for example the New York-based Council on Accreditation (see Annex 2). The oldest and most developed accreditation system is the one among colleges and universities in the US which has helped detect, eliminate and prevent academic fraud and abuse; and has assured adequate standardization of what an academic credit represents in order to facilitate transfer of credits from one institution to another[29].
Key advantages of this system are that it is peer-driven, self-regulated, helps sustain quality standards and image, allows for diversity in membership and for ‘replicability’ of services/standards in different parts of the world. It also offers opportunities for training and supportive advice to its members. Accreditation allows for both quality assurance and quality improvement by ensuring compliance to certain quality standards while providing guidance, training, exchange of best practices from peers. Thus, in a humanitarian context it could serve both disaster-affected people and humanitarian agencies. Specific disadvantages are that it does not deal specifically with recipient concerns and that it requires some form of central administration.
A number of NGO initiatives have focused on an accreditation or certification process. Several NGO networks—notably in the US—have combined a complaint-handling mechanism with some form of: 1) internal (peer review based) accreditation/certification; or 2) external accreditation/certification. First, the Maryland Association of Nonprofit Organizations has developed a voluntary peer-review based certification process with a ‘seal of approval’ for those NGOs who have successfully completed the process. So far, seven NGOs out of 950 members have gone through the certification process but a large number are currently being reviewed. (See Annex 2). This methodology is loosely based on the review process for accreditation of US universities and colleges.
Second, within InterAction, a system of external accreditation is being developed through an initiative of seven member NGOs involved in child sponsorship. Led by a couple of individuals committed to establishing some form of external accreditation following criticisms of truth in advertising in the media, these NGOs set up a panel of eight people outside the child sponsorship sector (including from the media, government, and auditing and public relations firms) to help develop more rigorous sector-specific standards than the ones available within InterAction (See Annex 2). In addition, these NGOs asked InterAction to select and contract an external body to develop an accreditation methodology.
The Council on Accreditation was asked to develop a methodology in consultation with the agencies based on the following criteria:
· the need for it to be participatory and a learning process (as opposed to punitive);
· to include site visits at the seven agency headquarters and at 30 field locations;
· to develop a sampling mechanism (for NGOs of very different size and with decentralized structures);
· integration of methodology into existing audit and evaluation practices;
· that expenses not exceed US$ 400,000
Although a peer review was considered, it was felt that an external team from an accreditation body would be more credible and less of a drain on resources[30]. Payment will be based on a tiered and incremental process depending on agency share of child sponsorship.
The 23 members states that are members of the Development Assistance Committee or DAC at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) use a peer review process to review comprehensively each aid program; to make recommendations to one another; and to generate good practice and shared objectives. According to the coordinator: “A committee like the DAC can make recommendations to a country that no country could make to one another.”[31]
The DAC Committee meets at least 15 times a year and the Chair is based at the OECD (usually someone high-level, a recognized “neutral” authority, i.e. currently the Director of Cooperation for France). This peer review process described in Annex 2 is time- and labor-intensive. Disclosure requirements are fairly demanding and ensure some level of response to recommendations and criticisms by the DAC country member under review. Immediately after the peer review meeting, a press release signed by Committee Chair is posted on OECD Website. In addition, provided there are no objections by Committee members, the summary and conclusions of the review meeting are posted on the OECD Website a week after review meeting. Finally, the full report is published and available to the public for sale.
An important effort in the humanitarian world providing a quality-setting code of conduct and subsequent process for implementation and accountability can be found in the recent experience of the People in Aid Code (see Annex 2). The People in Aid Code (PIA) was piloted by 13 British and Irish aid agencies from 1997 to 2000.Throughout the two-year process, pilot agencies shared experiences on how to best implement the People in Aid Code and learned about social auditing through workshops and seminars. Although social auditing was first started in the UK and is sometimes perceived as “a British thing”, the methods employed are, in fact, very similar to a Participatory Rural Appraisal.
Some important decisions were made at the outset of the piloting which are of interest to agencies looking to implement Sphere and be held accountable but are concerned about compliance[32]. The PIA decided that pilot agencies should not be the sole monitor of their compliance (i.e. without external verification as is the case with the Red Cross Code of Conduct and Sphere) but should not be monitored and certified exclusively by external audit either. Concerns related to the former included potential deficiency of reporting breaches of Code to the aid community; the problem that the process of internal monitoring may falter under pressure of agency work and finally, field staff and managers would have no independent verification of compliance to the Code.
Concerns regarding the use of an external auditor included additional costs to agency, limits of disclosure from external auditors, assurance regarding the independence and qualification of the auditor and perhaps most importantly, the possibility of being chastised for failure to comply to the Code when, in fact, honest effort had been made. The conflict between these two approaches was resolved through what is commonly referred to as a social audit—an evaluation methodology that involves extensive consultation with stakeholders (including recipients), internal staff—and finally, an external audit A report is under publication.
Several UK-based agencies have spent time and resources to attempt to develop a mechanism for handling complaints from, and advocate for, disaster-affected people. This initiative has faced significant opposition. In particular, serious concerns remain as to how this can be implemented in practice, for example:
·
how can access to beneficiaries be
secured,
·
what type of administrative structure
is required (decentralized, regional, system-wide),
·
how to manage/prioritize concerns,
·
what is potential exit strategy in a
given emergency,
·
competition between national
regulatory frameworks with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and codes of
conducts. Other concerns have focused on the role/responsibilities of other
actors, such as host governments and international organizations and on the
legitimacy of such an independent body.
Originally named the Ombudsman Project, the Humanitarian Accountability Project or HAP has been renamed and is entering a pilot phase. Field-testing is planned in three emergency situations including an ongoing humanitarian relief operation, in a weak or collapsed state and in a breaking emergency situation. HAP teams in the field will be using established humanitarian norms such as those contained in the Red Cross Code of Conduct, as well as IHL, Human Rights law and Refugee Law. Sphere’s Minimum Standards will be used as benchmarks only.
It is important to note that the initial June 1998 Ombudsman Project Feasibility Study and practical research conducted in Kosovo in 1999 concluded that accountability to beneficiaries of aid is generally seen as desirable—especially among NGO agency field staff—as those most affected by disaster lack a mechanism for voicing their concerns.
Increasing accountability using the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and
Minimum Standards is a complex task. Obviously, a collection of standards and
indicators alone cannot ensure quality. It is also true that one agency’s goals
in reaching standards can be compromised by external factors.
Other problems facing agencies include lack of trust, lack of
coordination and cooperation , as well as factors such as competition for
funds, cherry-picking by the media, poor staff management, personal vendettas,
and the increased scrutiny from donors and the public. In spite of these
factors, it is possible to develop a mechanism that can increase accountability
to disaster-affected people, ensure the highest levels of quality in that particular context, and, as a result, lead to a
more effective response in an emergency.
Criteria and characteristics of a viable compliance and accountability
mechanism for Sphere recurrent in interviews among Sphere Project Management
Committee members and other experts included:
· Increases accountability to disaster-affected people
· Based on peer-review
· Impartial and fair
·
Legitimate
·
System “with teeth”—ability to sanction and to judge ‘best effort’
(carrot and stick approach)
·
Decentralized (at field level)
·
Contextualized—allow for local variations, avoid monolith approach
·
Mechanism able to operate in ‘real time’
·
Evolving—allows for periodic revision of codes/standards not set in
time
·
Comprehensive—not only include technical Sphere standards but also
Humanitarian Charter, Red Cross Code of Conduct, IHL, Human Rights Law and
Refugee Law
·
Uses existing structures
Subsequently, this researcher has developed two very different
scenarios ranging from a peer-based model that is easiest to implement to a
comprehensive, system-wide model. They are: 1) collaborative assessments and
evaluations; and 2) NGO accreditation.
Before assessing the two scenarios it is important to note that this researcher has made the assumption that from a process point of view, the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards should not be separated. Furthermore, by encompassing the Humanitarian Charter, the Red Cross Code of Conduct has de facto been included. This will require further discussion among NGOs and possible research and field-testing but here are, in brief, advantages and concerns for including the Red Cross Code of Conduct into any compliance and accountability mechanism for Sphere:
Advantages:
· Need to take into account ethical, moral and political context of humanitarian intervention
· Worthwhile to have policy discussions among peers, such as when to enter/exit into a conflict. This will translate into more impact and more effective programming for disaster-affected people
· Will allow for better informed and more comprehensive advocacy efforts
Concerns:
·
Code of Conduct needs revision[33]:
in particular, Principle 1 and Principle 4 need to be strengthened in order to
be effective[34]
·
Code of Conduct has not been internalized by the majority of agency
staff, whether at headquarters or field level[35].
·
Who can make judgements about ethical, moral decisions, and how should
these decisions be made?
Taking into consideration the criteria put forward by people interviewed and the current context of accountability in humanitarian action, the most feasible and effective method in the short- and medium-term are collaborative assessments and evaluations.
Collaborative assessments and evaluations are joint, peer-based exercises that can take place during the initial phases of an emergency as an assessment or after an emergency as an evaluation. It is a process that allows a handful of agencies to voluntarily exchange information regarding programming and appropriate targeting in order to ensure quality, impact, appropriateness and effectiveness. It allows for the exchange of lessons learned in a context that is supportive. This process is field-based because 1) this is where the problems occur and 2) it allows for the understanding of the context of the situation and for local variations. Even member agencies opposing a compliance and accountability mechanism related to Sphere do concede that their people in the field have benefited from talking to their peers around common language developed in Sphere[36].
Headquarters, regional offices and other national bureaus have much to learn from field-based peer reviews. The lessons learned need to be reported back, or fed back, to agency headquarters. In turn, these lessons learned could inform the revision and updating process of the Sphere handbook.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both “real time” collaborative assessments or reactive evaluations[37]. Joint assessments occurring in ‘real time’ provide a mechanism for problem-solving; they ensure better programming through a process of discussion related to Sphere Standards and indicators and joint discussions on local “contextualization” of standards and the reality of constraints. Thus the assessments can increase cooperation and coordination between agencies and may ensure more appropriate disaster response. Disadvantages of ‘real time’ assessments are the burden placed on staff at outset of emergency in terms of time and resources and the danger that people critiques will turn confrontational. However, assessments need to take place anyway and a joint undertaking can help focus the process. Evaluations taking place reactively offer, perhaps, a greater degree of analysis; and allow time for a more thorough transfer of good practice information.
The NGOS participating in such collaborative activities would be voluntary and most likely be constituted of a small number of agencies actively engaged in the implementation of the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum standards in their policy and practice. Obviously, each agency has their own unique mandate and a shared understanding of these would be critical.
|
|
Collaborative
Assessments |
Collaborative
Evaluations |
|
Who |
In-country staff of collaborating NGOs with support from HQ |
Evaluation team (usually internal) of collaborating NGOs |
|
What |
Needs assessment in order to understand the context, establish the
level of need, undertake joint problem analysis and agree on priorities
(clarity of mandates critical) |
To evaluate impact and effectiveness of project/program by analyzing
process by which decisions were made and outcomes achieved based on Sphere
Minimum Standards |
|
How |
To be determined by type of emergency, agency familiarity with
situation, and various assessment methodologies |
Team of evaluators from collaborative NGOs undertake joint visits to
community, agency offices. Evaluation based on interviews and sources of data
including agency reports |
|
When |
In initial phase of
project/program |
Upon completion of project/program |
|
Why |
Rapidly and efficiently provide common understanding of the situation
and key information in the five life-saving sectors |
To learn lessons and improve response including understanding of how
context-specific indicators were generated and used |
|
Output |
Short documents providing contextual information, baseline data
referred to the key indicators and agreed-upon problem analysis |
Short lessons-learned document with possible feedback workshop |
Assessments or evaluations could be undertaken individually by the agencies and then reported back to the peer group or undertaken jointly. However, assessments or evaluations undertaken collaboratively allow for much greater learning in the process and offer more legitimacy as well as mitigate against sector or agency bias. A system of collaborative assessments and evaluations will only be viable if it is conducted by a small, committed group of agencies. It offers great advantages in terms of shared learning about best practices and has the advantage of reducing reporting time. The biggest threat to collaborative assessments and evaluations is that success will depend to a large extent on the goodwill and good faith of the individuals in the field. The quality of the joint assessments and evaluations may be challenged by the reality of high staff turnover, or difficult personalities, or be held hostage to previous turf battles. Peer pressure can consist and be reduced to the strength of personality at the table and to ‘staring contests’ as was the case to some extent during the JPO in Liberia[38]. This is why it would be important to have someone chair the process and meetings who provides structure and impartiality.
Process of Collaborative Assessments/Evaluations
Collaborative assessments and/or evaluations should be undertaken based on specific “rules of the game” established beforehand. These could be incorporated in a Framework Agreement or MoU signed by headquarters and which could, if desired, include policies and procedures regarding disclosure, type of criticisms, remedies for non-compliance and time allowed for redress, and hierarchical steps in referral of problems to regional office, headquarters, and their subsequent involvement in problem-solving.
Meetings will require structure, rules, and agenda, but will need to be flexible to allow for innovation. A chair will be needed to moderate the discussions and help along the peer review process. These discussions should focus on the process in which programming decisions were, or are being, made throughout the entire intervention and which resulted in compliance or non-compliance to Sphere rather than concentrating exclusively on outputs. In other words, throughout the assessment, indicators have to be constantly verified against context. For example, MSF-H reported that in a recent workshop in Indonesia, where MSF assist IDPs in urban facilities, it had a problem with a Sphere water indicator and thus needed to vastly modify it[39]. For MSF, this indicated a need to review indicators for water usage, as well as all other mitigating activities of the population. As Giesen concludes, " In the end not much of the original Sphere or MSF indicators remained. This is proof for the importance of using context indicators for compliance and accountability." On the other hand, a change in, or disregard for, an indicator can lead to greater, unforeseen problems later. For example, during a sanitation project in Mozambique following the floods, some NGOs thought that the Sphere sanitation indicator (20 people per latrine) was too high and costly as the camp population was scheduled to depart shortly and the funds could be better spent on sustainable infrastructure. However, by choosing this route, the population could suffer increased vulnerability to the spread of communicable disease due to overflowing latrines and the population defecating in random sites that could contaminate water sources, especially if there were delays in the resettlement of the population.
A chairperson should be elected by the agencies in the field based on recommendations by individual members. Ideally, this person would not be a staff member of one of the agencies taking part in collaborative assessments. He/she could be the head of the national NGO body, the head of the national complaints-handling committee (if there is one), a jurist, a UN field person based in that country/region, the head of a national NGO (but not one of the agencies’ implementing partners), or an independent consultant. Another model could be based on a revolving chair from one of the member agencies, in which case strict rules should be in place about conflict of interest (i.e. not be in the chair when agency is under review). The advantage of the external person is that ideally they can act as a mediator, if and when needed (for example, to mediate between two agencies, or between an agency and the government, or between the agency and local community representatives).
Even with collaborative assessments, it is difficult for individual agencies or families to raise criticisms, however constructive, about one another in a closed peer review context. If process is led without an external voice, it could well be guided by the strengths of the personalities present rather than in a factual, fair and respectful manner.
Aside from a chairperson, it may be beneficial to allow an external person (seasoned independent consultant or social auditor) to raise concerns based on a small investigation in the field (site visits, interviews) or review of external and internal documents and who could report on the truthfulness and accuracy of assessment/evaluation reports.
Community involvement, especially disaster-affected populations, would be a critical aspect of this process. In fact, the very first standard listed in every chapter of the Sphere handbook is an assessment standard that highlights participation.
While joint assessments is
a feasible mechanism, it does not
address the question of breach or redress. Questions such as the type of
breaches recognized, or the time allowed for redress will require specific
procedures to be agreed upon by the assessment teams and headquarters.
One solution could be the development of a system of graded
response depending on the severity of the breach—ranging from counseling,
mentoring, referral to agency’s regional office, referral to agency’s
headquarters, referral to NGO network in country of operation, and to other
networks. Most likely breaches would be handled at the field level with a
subsequent review at headquarter level. Such a system should be agreed upon and
established in the framework agreement or in the rules of the game
beforehand.
Feedback on collaborative assessments and/or
evaluations
This could take the form of a report written and signed by the chairperson with the help of the external consultant detailing the lessons-learned in the collaborative assessments and/or evaluations and including information on which agencies are in compliance or non-compliance to Sphere. Such a document should be checked for facts by the agencies mentioned. The report could then be sent to headquarters of the agencies participating in the joint assessments/evaluations.
Disclosure could include placing the reports in the public domain, for example by posting selected materials on the Sphere website (which could have links to agencies participating in the assessment). Or each agency could report via their own dissemination networks. Information could also be shared with such inter-agency forums as ALNAP, and with Sphere Management Committee member networks, such as SCHR, ICVA, InterAction and VOICE.
Advantages of Proposed Model of Collaborative Assessments/Evaluations
1. Provides for an explicit commitment to the Humanitarian Charter and the Minimum Standards.
2. Is a beginning of increased accountability—i.e. reports on compliance, is transparent through collaboration and potentially triggers responsiveness.
3. Develops an atmosphere of information sharing about best practices and mistakes based on common language and principles set out in Sphere AND a mechanism that encourages each agency to be accountable about its process and the quality of its services.
4. Responsiveness is encouraged through feedback to headquarters, to respective members of the Sphere Management Committee and possibly to ALNAP which records agency’s compliance as well as collects, monitors and shares evaluation approaches.
5. Inclusion of an external voice ensures that concerns can be raised more freely and supports the inclusion of community participation and leadership that adds to the accountability of the process through increased transparency.
6. Review of the support needed to local implementation partners of the collaborating agencies.
7. Is a decentralized, field-based system that allows for local variations, context and awareness of different stages of emergency situation.
8. Supports recent changes in management approaches toward direct operational responsibilities delegated to the field.
9. Does not add new structures and does not require large amounts of resources
|
Phase |
phase name |
timeframe |
description |
|
Phase I |
Internal
Implementation |
0-24 months |
a)
Take stock
of existing practices and procedures in several departments (advocacy,
policy, emergency, programming, monitoring and evaluation) b)
Set in
place policies, programs and practices to internalize Sphere Humanitarian
Charter and Minimum Standards at all levels (headquarters, regional,
country/field and senior, middle management, field workers) |
|
Phase II |
Internal
Review |
3 months |
a)
Review
programs and policies vis-a-vis the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum
Standards indicators b)
Share
results of internal review with peers |
|
Phase III |
Field
Implementation of collaborative assessments and/or evaluations |
3 months |
a)
Develop
Framework Agreement or MoU for field-based Collaborative
Assessments/Evaluations through interagency consultations and internal
consultations with field staff. b)
Specify
do’s and don’t, objectives and outputs. c)
Address
issues of non-compliance for agencies and clarify protocols of transparency,
redress, support, etc. as required/desired d)
Field
level: budget for additional resources (time and people) |
|
Phase IV |
Collaborative
assessments |
2-4 weeks |
Undertake collaborative assessments |
|
Phase V |
Feedback,
Lessons Learned and Response |
3 months |
a)
Collect
information from field; readjust/modify policy and practice; advocacy b)
Distribute
information about best practice and problems within agencies and with
selected third parties (E.g. Sphere Project Management Committee, UN’s Inter
Agency Standing Committee, ALNAP, donors)
|
Accreditation of NGO
agencies
While a big leap from collaborative assessments and/or evaluations, system-wide accreditation is a structure that is geared toward pursuing quality management and allows for the handling of complaints.
An accreditation system offers a number of advantages over any peer review process: it does not limit the number agencies wishing to participate—as do collaborative assessments and evaluations—and is far more inclusive. In addition, it allows for a diversity of NGOs—that may differ in size, mandate, objectives, governance, etc.—provided they all operate in a specific area (in the case of Sphere, NGOs that provide humanitarian assistance in water supply, sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and site planning, and health services).
Additionally, an accreditation system may provide a higher degree of transparency than a peer review process because part of the accreditation usually entails public disclosure, for example of the names of the agencies which have successfully completed the accreditation process. Monitoring by an external body ensures credibility and legitimacy. The process encourages agencies to redress inadequate practices and improve performance. Although such a system is more costly than the peer review system described in scenario 1, the costs are shared among many agencies. This allows for burden sharing based on specific criteria, such as size.
An important hurdle for this system is the development of an independent monitoring body (that does not currently exist), whether at national or international level. NGO networks, such as InterAction, have traditionally addressed activities such as advocacy, fundraising, and members networking (more recent developments have included promoting public trust). This NGO network, for example, does not have a mandate, and frequently little intent, to move into a monitoring role[40]. For example, it is unclear whether InterAction—which is acting as the guardian of the accreditation process of seven member agencies involved in child sponsorship—will undertake monitoring of them to ensure the maintenance of accreditation standards.
The legitimacy and independence of such an external accreditation body are crucial factors and raise questions about the constitution of the accreditation body and geographical authority. However, these questions cannot be answered within the context of this research—time and resources should be invested in further research of possibilities of NGO accreditation.
Some of the people interviewed during this research argue that given the levels of discord, mistrust and competition among the humanitarian NGOs, there is no sufficient will to develop additional structures that could undertake agency accreditation (whether on a peer-level basis or not). Some of them have put forward the notion of accreditation of individuals instead.
Accreditation of
individuals
To overcome agency politics, several experts are suggesting to accreditation of individuals rather than agencies[41]. Individuals could be accredited through a mentoring process, such as the ones that exist in many sectoral professional associations. For example, such a process for health professionals could be integrated into an existing network such as RedR, which now has offices in London, Australia and Geneva. However, there are several problems with accreditation of individuals, including:
- Emergency relief workers do not only require technical skills—so how to define ‘core competencies’ of emergency relief worker[42]?
- Who/what will be the accreditation body?
- How to ensure it is a system based on merit and how to avoid nepotism and influence peddling? Stories of such scandals in the UK professional medical associations abound in the press
- This system creates discrepancies between people who can afford training and certification and those who cannot (North-South divide); and is not comprehensive
- A criticism is that one cannot and should not technicalize aid, as this goes against the core values of humanitarianism
- An important problem in practice is what to do when the agency/organization that has hired an accredited individual requires him/her to conduct programs that contradict the standards and values against which that individual has been accredited?
In summary, it appears that individual accreditation may be more problematic than NGO accreditation.
The surest way to develop a viable compliance and
accountability system is to go step-by-feasible step. Such a roadmap would
begin with agencies that are willing to pilot a framework of collaborative
assessments and evaluations (such as the Sphere Project’s pilot agencies) and
then move to include other interested organizations. In parallel, membership
networks such as InterAction or VOICE, may choose to develop their own system[43]. Thus,
accountability and compliance related to Sphere will grow incrementally and
organically—rather than be imposed from the outside—until critical mass is
reached.
If they are willing, the 20 agencies or families that are the Sphere Project’s pilot agencies could strengthen both their internal reporting mechanisms and develop an external accountability mechanism such as the one proposed in scenario 1 in the form of collaborative assessments and/or evaluations. A four-step approach is illustrated below.
Steps |
Objective |
|
|
Step A |
To implement and internalize institutionally the minimum standards and indicators and humanitarian charter into program development, policy and advocacy |
Implementation
& Training |
|
Step B |
To monitor internally whether they have complied or not to the minimum standards and humanitarian charter (and increase commitment to the use if monitoring to indicators) |
Internal
Reporting |
|
Step C |
To strengthen adherence/compliance to Sphere and increase accountability through sharing of information with stakeholder groups |
Collaborative Assessments
and/or Evaluations (peer review) |
|
Step D |
To start thinking of ways to move toward a
system-wide compliance of Sphere by all actors in the humanitarian system |
Accreditation
(system-wide accountability) |
In the end, it is the collective will to change and to encourage self-inspection that will have the most impact on the public and media, if appropriately communicated. This will, in turn, create greater tolerance among the public and the media, allow for better communication with disaster-affected people, and provide a stronger platform from which to call to account other actors in the humanitarian complex.
[1] The Sphere Project handbook, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, 2000, Page 273
[2] Definition developed by the Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability (ISEA). See discussion paper for the Active Learning Network on Accountability Performance: Mapping Accountability in Humanitarian Assistance, Peter Raynard, April 2000. Page 5
[3] Mapping Accountability, Peter Raynard, 2000
[4] Presentation: Evaluation practices in MSF Holland, Andre Griekspoor. Workshop Evaluation Humanitarian Aid: policies, perspectives and practices, 25 and 26 June, 1999. Disaster Studies, Wageningen University, the Netherlands
[5] Interviews by phone with Sam Worthington (July 2000), Barkley Calkins (June 2000), and meeting with Jim Bishop (April 2000)
[6] Accountability can be divided into three areas: “…‘fiscal accountability’ which demonstrates the foundation’s financial integrity, ‘process accountability’ i.e. proving that the foundation has achieved the aims to which it is committed and ‘programme accountability,’ which is intended to show that the foundation has acted in accordance with its stated aims.” Commentary in Codes of Conduct for Partnership in Governance, Emmanuelle Faure, European Foundation Centre, 1999, page 112
[7] Speaking Notes to IDS, The Search for Standards and Accountability in Emergency Relief Operations, Nick Stockton, Oxfam, February 2000
[8] Interview with Jean-Marie Kindermans, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Brussels, June 2000
[9] Disasters, Volume 20, N#4, Evaluating the International Humanitarian System, Niels Dabelstein, December 1996
[10] The Sphere Project handbook, 2000
[11] Mapping Accountability, Peter Raynard, 2000, P. 12.
[12] Presentation Handouts: Self-Regulation, Quality Assurance and Accountability in Humanitarian Action. A Critical Review, Koenraad Van Brabant, Overseas Development Institute, March 2000
[13] This is the first phase of social auditing. See Auditing the People in Aid Code, report of a workshop, February 1998
[14] Summary of ODI evaluation, The Monitoring and Evaluation of Empowerment, INTRAC, The International NGO Training and Research Centre, November 1999
[15] Auditing the People in Aid Code, report of a workshop, February 1998
[16] This was one of the findings in the People in Aid process. (See annex 2 and Auditing the People in Aid Code, report of a workshop, February 1998
[17] Comment by Andre Griekspoor at ALNAP meeting in 1999 (as former Head of Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, MSF - Holland).
[18] Auditing the People in Aid Code, 1998
[19] Correspondence with Jamie Mc Caul, Disasters Emergency Committee, July 2000
[20] Interview by phone with Jeff Crisp, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, June 2000
[21] Forced Migration Review: Thinking Outside the Box: Evaluation and Humanitarian Action, Jeff Crisp, forthcoming
[22] UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit: Participatory and Beneficiary-Based Approaches to the Evaluation of Humanitarian programmes, Tania Kaiser, June 2000
[23] Correspondence with Anne Buchanan, Canadian Council for International Co-Operation, June 2000
[24] Humanitarian Policy Group Report 2: The Politics of Principle: the principles of humanitarian action in practice, Nicholas Leader, March 2000
[25] see www.crdaethiopia.org and the International Council of Voluntary Agency’s newsletter Talk Back, April 2000
[26] In the formulation of the Code, the following resources were used: the Red Cross NGO Code of Conduct, a Code of Practice of the NGO Sector in Africa, InterAction’s PVO Standards and a (draft) copy of the Sphere Minimum Standards
[27] Interview with Jim Bishop, InterAction, Washington DC, June 2000
[28] Commentary in Codes of Conduct for Partnership in Governance, Paul Thompson, Project Concern International and InterAction PVO Standards Committee, 1999
[29] Keynote Address for second Council for Higher Education
Accreditation “Usefulness” Conference: The Contemporary Context of Accreditation:
Challenges in a Changing Environment, Robert Glidden, Ohio University Dean,
June 1998
[30] Initial research had shown that a peer review team would need to be on the road for 2-3 months to undertake accreditation for six NGOs. Interview by phone with Sam Worthington, Childreach, July 2000
[31] Interview by phone with Arthur Fell, DAC Peer Review, OECD, June 2000
[32] Discussion paper for People in Aid Steering Group, Monitoring Pilot Implementation of the People in Aid Code of Best Practice, September 1997, p.6-8
[33] Interview with Nicholas Stockton, Geneva, May 2000 & The Code of Conduct—A Personal View, Nicholas Stockton, May 2000
[34] Principle 1: The Humanitarian imperative comes first. Principle 4: We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy, The Code of Conduct: Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, 1994
[35] Conclusions of DEC Study: A Swiss Prince, A Glass Slipper and the Feet of 15 British Aid Agencies, Hugo Slim and Isobel McConnan, October 1998
[36] Comment by Andre Griekspoor.
[37] The Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit at UNHCR is in the process of developing and field-testing a framework for “Real Time Evaluation.” It describes a real-time evaluation as “a timely, rapid and interactive peer review undertaken during an emergency. Its general objective is to determine the effectiveness and impact of a given UNHCR emergency response, and to ensure that its findings are absorbed by emergency managers swiftly and in an agile manner.” Real-time Emergency Evaluations: a provisional framework, Arafat Jamal, UNHCR’s Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, July 2000.
[38] The ‘Joint Policy Operation’ and the “Principles and Protocols of Humanitarian Operation in Liberia,’ Nicholas Leader, 2000
[39] Correspondence with Peter Giesen, MSF-Holland, July 2000
[40] Correspondence with Jim Bishop, June 2000
[41] Interview by phone with Steve Collins, June 2000
[42] Interview with Sean Lowrie, Sphere Project, Geneva, May 2000
[43] For example, a member of the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response suggested there should be more comprehensive discussions among members of the network. Interview with Jean-Marie Kindermans, Medecins Sans Frontieres International, Brussels, June 2000
[44] Based on Mapping Accountability, Peter Raynard, April 2000